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Technocracy vs. 
legitimacy? An artificial 
debate  
 
Every political system – national or 
other – is a balance of efficiency and 
legitimacy. Such balance may change 
over time (depending on political 
requirements) and space (depending 
on local traditions); but all systems 
include elements of both.  
So it should come as no surprise that 
the euro zone debt crisis has had an 
impact on that balance too: of the 
five countries most severely hit to 
date – one is tempted to label them 
as the GIPSI, an acronym that also 
reflects better than any other one the 
sequencing of the crises – three have 
undergone political change through 
elections (Ireland, Portugal, Spain) 
and two have done so without (at 
least so far), giving way instead to 
“technocratic” administrations 
(Greece, Italy).  
While the governments currently led, 
respectively, by Lucas Papademos 
and Mario Monti present some 
differences regarding to the ratio of 
“technocrats” in their ranks – and 
may also end up having different life 
spans – they certainly have in 
common the fact that they are led by 
former top EU officials at a time 
when the two countries need to (re)
gain the full confidence of Brussels 
and other European capitals.  
Actually, Mario Monti is not the first 
former European Commissioner to 
be appointed Prime Minister at 
home. Before him, and not long ago, 
the same happened to another 
Italian: Romano Prodi. Yet he had 
already been at the head of Italy’s 
government before coming to 
Brussels – and it is worth 
mentioning that, since then and 
especially over the past few years, a 
number of other former PMs have 
indeed joined the college. 
In fact, the only relevant precedent 
for Monti is Raymond Barre, 
European Commissioner between 
1967-73 and French PM between 
1976-81, who was appointed by then 
President Valery Giscard d’Estaing 
as the country’s “best economist” – 
t h u s  i n  a  q u i n t e s s e n t i a l 
“technocratic” capacity.  
In the past, however, a number of 
European governments have been 
led by unelected personalities with a 
marked technocratic profile without 
raising concerns about their 
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legitimacy: it happened, for instance, to Poland 
before and the Czech Republic after their 
respective EU accession. Italy itself, on its way to 
joining the euro in the 1990s, was led twice by 
former central bankers: one of them, Carlo 
Azeglio Ciampi, later became also President of 
the Republic – as did Horst Köhler, another 
central banker, in Germany. 
Beyond (and behind) Plato and Machiavelli 
From Plato’s philosopher-kings to Machiavelli’s 
ambition to teach his Prince the arts and crafts 
of ruling, from the Enlightenment to Oxbridge 
and the grandes écoles, the link between specialist 
knowledge and public policy has been a 
recurrent feature of European culture and 
politics. America, too, has had its own debates 
about the role of what David Halberstam 
famously called "the best and the brightest" – 
from the Founding Fathers themselves to 
Roosevelt’s “brain trust” and Kennedy’s 
“eggheads”.  
This is to say that there is nothing extraordinary 
in the presence of “technocrats” in Western 
governments (which, incidentally, also highlights 
their sense of public service and readiness to take 
the heat at a critical time). Having personalities in 
charge who do understand market behaviour and 
can discuss yield curves and derivatives is 
definitely not a bad thing these days, and several 
European governments include former central 
bankers and financial experts anyway. The 
relationship between domestic policy, 
coordination and integration at EU level, and the 
globalisation of financial markets has become an 
increasingly intimate one. It is not by accident 
that analysts often resort to the term “inter-
mestic” to define this domain – and handling it 
requires multiple skills, including reputational 
ones. 
Moreover, the equation between different levels 
of governance and policy-making is now made 
all the more complex by the need to factor in 
both peer pressure and external conditionality. 
Although some West European countries had to 
resort to the IMF already in the 1970s to tackle 
specific debt crises, what is new and unique this 
time around is the level of interdependence 
between lenders and borrowers, which risks 
generating cascading effects well beyond national 
borders and governmental boundaries, thus 
making this crisis a systemic one.  
The interconnectedness of financial markets, in 
turn, risks making it a global one, with 
worldwide repercussions of unprecedented 
magnitude. It was indeed quite striking – and 
telling – to hear US President Barack Obama 
talking about Greece and Italy at the final press 
conference of the Asia-Pacific Economic 
Cooperation (APEC) summit meeting in Hawaii 
in mid-November. 
A challenging trilemma 
The current and somewhat artificial controversy 
over unelected technocrats vs. elected politicians 
– that often involves also the role of 
EU institutions, especially the Commission – 
would strongly benefit from the analysis and the 
arguments put forward by the Harvard 
economist Dani Rodrik. In a recent book (The 
Globalisation Paradox), he illustrates what he calls 
the “fundamental political trilemma” of the 
current world economy: “we cannot 
simultaneously pursue democracy, national 
determination, and economic globalisation”. In 
other words, we can have any two of them, but 
not all three. His conclusion, however, is that 
acknowledging this reality should not necessarily 
lead to the end of any one of the three: 
“smart” (as opposed to “maximum”) 
globalisation is still conceivable and, above all, 
fully compatible with “re-empowering” national 
democracies.  
In this light, the EU construction appears as a 
unique equation or, rather, as a peculiar interface 
between various spheres. Indeed, both top 
technocrats and political leaders are struggling 
with the “trilemma”, albeit to different degrees, 
and seem determined to test the validity’s of 
Rodrik’s “law” by de facto replacing “national” 
with “European”.  
This issue of BEPA Monthly Brief comes out in 
the midst of the arguably most difficult moment 
of this long crisis. It does not pretend to offer 
final answers or workable solutions – just to ask 
the right questions and to put the problems in 
the right context, both politically and technically. 
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The worst arguments are those where both sides 
have a strong case – like the debate of the euro 
zone crisis. The creditor countries point to 
indicators for reckless fiscal spending in Greece, 
weak bank supervision in Ireland, and high levels 
of private indebtedness in Spain and Portugal. 
On top of these, they emphasize data for 
competitiveness: large current account deficits, 
high prices and wages, and declining market 
shares for exports. Their claim is that the debtor 
countries would not be in such a difficult 
situation if they had shown more self-control. 
The debtor countries see something subtly 
different. They focus on the huge flow of capital 
that came into their economies during the early 
years of the euro. They ask whether it is realistic 
for all countries to aim for export led growth. 
And they argue that the sudden and continuing 
flight of capital to the safety of German bonds is 
what has triggered both the collapse in sovereign 
debt prices and banking funding problems. 
These different perspectives suggest different 
solutions. The creditor countries want to see 
more adjustment at the national levels and call 
on the debtors to cut back on their borrowing 
and bring competitiveness into line. The debtor 
countries point to problems at the systemic level, 
and argue for a more aggressive response from 
the European Central Bank (ECB) in the short 
term to be paired with the more gradual 
development of euro-bonds. 
These solutions are compatible but the order of 
operations is not. The creditors want the debtors 
to demonstrate their worthiness to participate in 
a strengthened euro zone. The debtors want the 
euro zone to be strengthened so that they have 
the time and resources to undertake necessary 
reforms. 
Such subtleties are often lost on the public, 
which sees only one side or the other of the 
argument through the Manichean rhetoric of the 
tabloid press. In this extreme telling of the 
argument, the Greeks are deceitful and unworthy 
while the Germans are overbearing and 
ungenerous. Each side sees itself as being 
wronged so that the other side can benefit. 
Solidarity across Europe is weakened by such 
depictions. Trust in European institutions suffers 
collateral damage. 
People(s) and populism 
The Eurobarometer public opinion polling surveys 
show a clear trend in attitudes. From November 
2009 to May 2011, the tendency to trust in the 
European Commission and the European 
Central Bank (ECB) has fallen while the opposite 
tendency has risen. Over the same period, the 
tendency not to trust in the EU as a whole has 
become larger than the tendency to trust in it. 
Similar trends can be seen in responses to 
questions about whether EU membership is a 
good or a bad thing, though positive perceptions 
clearly prevail. 
The point here is not that national governments 
benefit from this loss of confidence in Europe. 
The Eurobarometer surveys show a clear 
predominance in the tendency not to trust 
national governments as well as parliaments. Even 
at their worst, the European institutions do much 
better. Yet it would be unrealistic to assume that 
the EU institutions can draw on the same 
wellspring for legitimacy. Identification with 
Europe is much weaker than identification with 
the member states; direct democratic participation 
at the national level is both stronger and more 
familiar; and, as research by Neil Fligstein has 
shown, most Europeans continue to live within 
the confines of their national cultures. 
The significance of any damage to the reputation 
of the EU should not be underestimated – for 
both positive and negative reasons. On the 
positive side, compliance with European efforts 
at coordination is much stronger when the 
EU benefits from popular trust and support. As 
support declines, compliance weakens and so the 
process of coordination becomes less credible.  
The more negative concern relates to political 
mobilization against “Europe”. Populist 
1 The other casualties of  the crisis 
By Erik Jones* 
* Erik Jones is Professor of European Studies (SAIS, Johns Hopkins University) and Director, Bologna Institute for Policy Research.  
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politicians often seek to exploit any loss of 
confidence in EU institutions as part of a more 
general campaign against political “elites”. The 
Swedish Democrats and the True Finns are good 
examples. These movements are well aware of 
the broad support for European integration 
among the more well-established political parties. 
They are also aware of the discontent brewing 
within the populations of their countries. Their 
objective therefore is to combine attacks on 
traditional political parties with attacks on 
European policies: immigration in both 
countries; participation in the single currency in 
Sweden; support for sovereign debt bailouts in 
Finland. 
Examples of this type of combined mobilization 
strategy can be found all across the EU. The 
most prominent include Heinz-Christian 
Strache’s Austrian Freedom Party, Geert 
Wilders’ Party of Freedom, and Marine Le Pen’s 
National Front. Not all of these parties are new, 
and neither are their political programs. The 
crisis did not create this mobilization possibility, 
but it has rendered the strategy of combining 
criticism of European integration with attacks on 
traditional political elites more effective – and it 
has brought that strategy more clearly into the 
mainstream of national campaigning. 
Patterns at work? 
The question is how long it will take before 
larger and more well-established political forces 
begin to adapt that strategy themselves as part of 
a process of “renewal” and in order to compete 
with the extremes. The rise of “euroscepticism” 
among Conservative Party backbenchers in the 
early 1990s illustrates how potent such a 
transformation can be. Then, as now, populist 
challengers used discontent with what they 
described as an ineffectual ruling class that had 
too closely aligned itself with the process of 
European integration. This argument was not 
new to the UK or to the Tories. In the aftermath 
of the 1992 exchange rate crisis, however, it soon 
became predominant – with lasting implications 
for popular attitudes toward the EU. 
A similar dynamic may be about to play out 
within Silvio Berlusconi’s People of Liberty party 
in Italy. The motivation will be to hold onto the 
center-right electorate and keep the ambitions of 
Umberto Bossi’s Northern League in check. The 
first indications were given while Berlusconi was 
still Prime Minister. He had just returned from a 
difficult European Council summit meeting to 
face a weak bond auction on 28 October. His 
response was to shift the blame to the euro, 
“which never convinced anyone as a currency”.  
This attack will fall on fertile ground. Many 
Italians distrust the euro and a plurality believes 
that they would have managed the crisis with the 
old Lira. If political competition is engaged on 
this theme, the end result will not be a 
groundswell of Italian voices calling for exit from 
the euro: it will be a more general and diffuse 
sense of disillusionment with the European 
project as a whole. 
Collateral damage 
This is where the collateral damage to Europe 
from the crisis will be felt. European integration 
has long benefited from a permissive consensus 
bolstered by what Fritz Scharpf described as 
“output” legitimacy. Europeans have tended to 
support integration as a broad set of objectives, 
and they have seen the economic advantages of 
the EU as validation for that support. Now that 
the economic advantages have been called into 
question, popular support for European 
integration has begun to wane.  
It is not the first time this has happened. A 
similar process took place in the 1970s and 1990s 
as well. This time, however, it is exacerbated by a 
clear conflict in perspectives over the causes and 
consequences of the sovereign debt crisis. As 
long as that conflict continues, it will be difficult 
to reestablish a consensus on the benefits of 
Europe. And, given the strength of the 
arguments – and emotions – on both sides of the 
debate, there is little to indicate that the conflict 
will soon be resolved. 
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2 Solvency, liquidity and the crisis 
By Baudouin Regout* 
Lack of political agreement among European policy 
makers and stakeholders is often referred to for the 
ongoing and even worsening sovereign debt crisis 
in the euro zone. However, deeply rooted 
misunderstanding and disagreement of the true 
nature of the crisis is at least as much to blame. 
In fact, an important element was misunderstood 
at the outset and is still not fully grasped, namely 
the difference between solvency and liquidity, 
including the fact that we are dealing with two 
sovereign debt crises at the same time: a solvency 
crisis for one or more countries, and a liquidity 
crisis for others (let alone the banking crisis, which 
is interwoven with both). The current crisis started 
out primarily as a solvency crisis, but then became 
increasingly a (market) liquidity crisis. 
Solvency refers to one’s ability to pay back the 
totality of its debt over time. It measures whether 
future revenues (including the sale of assets) are 
enough to do that. Solvency can thus be improved 
by increasing future revenues and/or decreasing 
the amounts owed. 
Liquidity refers to the immediate availability of cash 
to pay short-term obligations. Liquidity can be 
improved by borrowing money. This, of course, 
requires being solvent, i.e. able to pay back one’s 
debt in the future – or else no bank or investor 
would be willing to lend. 
The EU has initially proposed liquidity solutions 
for countries with solvency problems (e.g. Greece), 
and is currently betting on solvency solutions for 
countries with liquidity problems (e.g., Spain, Italy). 
This mismatch needs to be addressed. It is not only 
a question of delivering an effective and efficient 
response, but also one of avoiding 
counterproductive effects. Therefore, solutions 
need to be targeted, tailored, and differentiated in 
function of the specific challenges faces by 
countries. 
Solvency & Greece 
A government’s solvency is assessed primarily by 
looking at the evolution of its debt-to-GDP ratio. 
It is well accepted for governments to maintain 
certain levels of debt, rolling over previous 
obligations into newly issued debt. Investors and 
financial markets are typically willing to provide 
funding as they find in government securities an 
attractive, low-risk and highly liquid asset. It is 
equally acceptable that such debt grows in line with 
the country’s economic growth. 
There is, however, a limit. As debt levels grow, a 
“snow-ball” effect increasingly kicks in: interest 
rate charges on the debt become so large that 
government have to borrow ever more just to 
service them. Consequently, debt grows out of 
control, outpacing GDP growth. How early and 
strongly this snow-ball effect kicks in depends on 
the level of debt, the interest rates and the growth 
trajectory of each country. Ultimately, the snow-
ball effect undermines a country’s ability to pay 
back its debt and remain solvent. 
Greece has been facing such fundamental solvency 
issue. To restore its solvency, Greece needs 
“austerity”, i.e. to restore a positive primary 
surplus, and structural reform to support growth: 
this is a minimum but insufficient requirement.  
Indeed, there is only so much austerity one can 
impose on a country without significantly 
damaging its economic growth. In addition, Greece 
needs to reduce the amount it owes, for instance 
via a “haircut” or bond buy-back/exchange plan; 
or to be financed for up to 20 years at a very low 
interest rate; or, of course, to do both. 
Initial solutions were only providing liquidity 
solutions, i.e., short term lending at relatively high 
interest rates. This merely saved time and ’kicked 
the can down the road’. The combined decisions 
of the summits of July 21 and October 26, 2011 
proposed for the first time a solvency solution 
through a lowering of the amount due via the 
“Private Sector Involvement”, a massive debt 
maturity extension, and a lowering of interest rates. 
Liquidity & Spain, Italy 
Moving beyond Greece and to some extent also 
Portugal and Ireland, which have similar 
“solvency” challenges, the nature of the crisis 
*Baudouin Regout is an Adviser in the Analysis Team of BEPA. 
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changed, as its key drivers were not the country 
fundamentals any more. For some countries – like 
Spain and, now, Italy – it is not any more about 
“markets fearing the fundamentals of a country”, 
but about “markets fearing markets”. The markets fear 
that the market “sentiment” – a highly subjective 
and prejudicial notion – may turn against a country. 
Indeed, if and when that happens, a country that is 
fundamentally solvent will eventually become 
insolvent, the victim of a self-fulfilling prophecy. 
Once real interest rates shoot up to, say, 10 per 
cent (as investors sell the country’s government 
bonds), the gap between real interest and real GDP 
growth rates would simply become so wide that no 
realistic amount of austerity and growth would 
counter the snow-ball effect; and no country – not 
even Germany – would remain solvent. 
It is a bit like a “bank run”: if all depositors pull off 
all their savings, even the best or biggest bank in 
the world will fail. This is why banks’ solvency is 
regulated, and why central banks were created as 
lenders of last resort. 
The US and the UK have arguably worse 
fundamentals than for instance Spain, but 
somehow enjoy lower interest rates, despite the 
American near-default experience in August. In the 
final analysis, the US and the UK have central 
banks that have shown that they will stand by their 
governments’ debt if need be. The US has done 
that repeatedly in its history, including in this crisis, 
though “quantitative easing” (now equivalent to 
the entire US public deficit). So did the UK. And 
markets know that the two central banks can 
“outgun” them. 
In the euro area, instead, the EFSF has limited 
scope and cannot be strong enough to finance 
Spain and/or Italy, while the ECB remains 
ambivalent about standing by even solvent 
countries. Investors are therefore concluding that 
nobody would act as a lender of last resort if 
markets go crazy against a country. So, when that 
starts happening, it becomes rational and prudent 
even for non-speculative investors to pull out. 
A way forward  
As a consequence, the solution to the crisis 
requires a lender of last resort for governments, 
just as for banks. That lender of last resort must be 
big enough and even have the ultimate weapon: “a 
printer in the basement”. Only the ECB has 
unlimited firepower and can play a role similar to 
the Federal Reserve in the US and the Bank of 
England in the UK. The “printer in the basement” 
is the equivalent of nuclear deterrence in the Cold 
War: it has to be a credible threat that one hopes 
never to use. 
At the same time, no central bank should be in the 
business of absorbing “credit or solvency” loss, i.e. 
bailing out fundamentally insolvent countries. 
Instead, the EFSF/ESM or other (the “fund”) 
could absorb the credit risk, providing credit 
insurance for the extremely unlikely case of a 
solvent country’s default. This would allow the 
ECB to play only a liquidity provider’s role, without 
credit risk, if/when markets break down – a role 
that it is much more in line with its mandate and 
philosophy. 
Moreover, such a solution would leverage much 
more effectively the fund’s core endowment, as the 
buffer required to absorb credit loss is a fraction of 
the money lent to governments. To avoid a 
transfer union (if this is the controversial point), the 
fund could charge an insurance premium to the 
covered countries and monitor conditionality. 
This could be seen, of course, as undermining the 
principle of non-monetary financing. Yet 
safeguards can be put in place to avoid those risks 
(the US and the UK never led their countries to 
hyper-inflation). 
In sum, the EU needs to provide appropriate 
answers to both solvency issues and liquidity/
market risks – which may imply differentiated 
treatment from country to country: 
Fundamental solvency risks/issues need to be 
addressed by a combination of debt consolidation 
with low interest rate (where still possible) and debt 
reduction (where ultimately unavoidable); 
Liquidity/market risks can only be addressed by the 
right institutional set-up, thus giving the euro zone 
the same warranty of unwavering support of the 
central bank as other developed sovereign 
countries. 
Credit insurance provided by a European fund for 
the solvent countries would thus neatly separate 
solvency and liquidity issues, allowing the ECB to 
use its instruments to ensure government bond 
market liquidity.  
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A Three-pillar Firepower to Solve the Euro-
pean Sovereign Crisis: A last chance! 
This paper proposes tackling the sovereign debt and 
banking crises with a comprehensive multi-pillar 
mechanism that involves cash and synthetic solu-
tions aimed at enhancing the European Financial 
Stability Facility (EFSF), but without necessitating 
any structural transformation. Accordingly, the pu-
blic and private sectors would collaborate to design 
the necessary tools – a blend of cash and guarantees 
– capable of convincing the market. Central to this 
framework are the credibility of the public-private 
guarantee of potential future losses and the effecti-
veness of the instruments that the mechanism 
would design. This mechanism must be agreed at 
the highest political levels and implemented promp-
tly to halt the downward spiral that could lead to a 
protracted recession in the EU – a scenario conside-
red as highly plausible today, if no credible political 
action is taken. 
http://www.ceps.eu/book/three-pillar-firepower-solve-
european-sovereign-crisis-last-chance 
The International Monetary System is Chan-
ging: What opportunities and risks for the euro? 
The authors foresee that the International Mone-
tary System (IMS) will undergo major changes in 
the next two decades. The role of the dollar as 
the main reserve currency will gradually erode 
due to the relative decline of the US economic 
weight and growing concerns of countries (such 
as China) that are exposed to US external imba-
lances. In the next 10-15 years, a more multi-
polar IMS is likely to take shape. The Chinese 
renminbi will probably become a leading and 
reserve currency. Regarding the euro, although 
the outcome of the ongoing debt crisis is far 
from predictable, the institutional reforms under-
taken could both strengthen internal stability and 
external attractiveness. Such action would ensure 
a prominent role for the euro in the IMS. 
http://www.bruegel.org/publications/publication-
detail/publication/632-the-international-monetary-
system-is-changing-what-opportunities-and-risks-for-the-
euro/ 
The EU as Global Robin Hood: Proposal for 
a multilateral convention on a global finan-
cial transaction tax 
The paper examines the institutional and legal chal-
lenges that the creation of an international Financial 
Transaction Tax (FTT) raise. It underlines the im-
mense barriers to be overcome should the EU 
continue to pursue this objective. An international 
convention on FTT would require defining the tax’s 
scope and rate; distributing revenues; and establis-
hing a conflict-settlement regime. Its monitoring 
should be assigned either to a reformed IMF or to a 
new international organisation. However, the pros-
pect of a new hard law regime seems implausible 
today given US and BRIC opposition. Only a united 
and resolute front of EU member states, and a Eu-
ropean discourse articulated around goals of funding 
global public goods and correcting the financial 
market, could make a difference in the long term. 
h t t p : / / w w w . a s s e r . n l / u p l o a d /
documents/992011_104937cleer2011-4web.pdf  
The 2011 Euro Plus Monitor: Progress and 
the turmoil 
The publication proposes to rank euro zone coun-
tries according to their overall economic health and 
to their speed of adjustment to the challenges rai-
sed by the sovereign debt crisis. While acknowled-
ging the political difficulty of the task, the survey 
finds that long-awaited structural reforms are effec-
tively being implemented in most countries. 
Greece, Portugal, Spain and Ireland rank among 
the top-adjusting countries. As hinted by the Esto-
nian recovery, the resolute addressing of fiscal im-
balances and competitiveness gaps leaves reasona-
ble hope of long-term resilience and convergence 
with top performers (unsurprisingly, Germany, the 
Netherland, Finland and Austria). France should 
be the primary matter of concern since it combines 
mediocre fundamental health with poor adjusting 
performance. Thus, a reduction of labour costs and 
an easing of employment regulation are urgently 
required. 
http://www.lisboncouncil.net/in-the-news/313-the-
2011-euro-plus-monitor-progress-amid-the-turmoil.html  
3 Think Tank Twitter 
Think Tank Twitter (TTT) aims to provide regular information and updates on what is produced by think tanks and research centres across 
Europe (and beyond) on EU policy issues. As an analogy to the original Twitter, each summary – or tweet – does not exceed 140 words, rather 
than characters. Those who wish to signal new publications for possible inclusion can send them to the email address bepa-think-tank-
twitter@ec.europa.eu 
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The Open Method of Coordination: A gover-
nance mechanism for the G20? 
There is no realistic alternative to the G20 for 
the management of global economics. Yet, the 
forum’s limited impact – as the recent Cannes 
summit confirmed – creates growing concern. 
The report argues that the G20 must not only 
become more legitimate by further enlarging its 
base, but above all more efficient. Today, 
’prisoner’s dilemma’ best characterises the fol-
low-up of summits, whereby member countries 
implement recommendations incoherently. The 
transformation of the G20 into a permanent 
structure and the use of the EU’s “open method 
of coordination” are well designed to address 
this structural weakness. Final communiqués 
should include precise, context specific and time-
ly goals. A permanent secretariat should deliver 
evaluation and boost peer review and mutual 
learning. Several G20 members have oriented 
themselves towards this Europe-inspired type of 
soft law governance. 
http://www.bertelsmann-stiftung.de/cps/rde/
xchg/SID-89E82D61-D14472D2/bst/hs.xsl/
nachrichten_110230.htm 
Die Weltraumpolitik der EU. (The space po-
licy of the EU) 
This paper focuses on the development of the 
European Space Policy (ESP), concentrating on 
its implications on EU policy fields of its Mem-
ber States. These implications result not least 
from the April 2007 Commission communica-
tion on the ESP. Besides analysing this commu-
nication, the paper assesses the two flagship pro-
jects the EU conducts with the European Space 
Agency (ESA): the Galileo satellite programme 
and Global Monitoring for Environment and 
Security (GMES). While Galileo can be used for 
both civil and military purposes, the civilian di-
rection of the ESP is more dominant. The report 
calls for: (1) Germany to build a strategic part-
nership with France; (2) Germany to actively en-
gage in ESP in the EU and ESA; and (3) Germa-
ny to contribute to the development of a genuine 
European space strategy. 
http://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/
products/studien/2011_S26_dkw_ks.pdf 
 
Les citoyens européens et l’Union euro-
péenne dans le contexte actuel de crise 
This paper analyses current populist trends in 
European public opinion. Having first emerged 
in 19th century USA as a backlash against the wi-
dening gap between representatives and the peo-
ple, ’populism’ is a necessary element of demo-
cracy. It is a recurring ideology and a highly wor-
kable rhetorical resource, especially for small po-
litical parties. Today’s anti-EU discourse points 
to three aspects: the weak democratic legitimacy 
of Community institutions; alleged consequences 
of policies of free movement on immigration; 
and the supposed neoliberal bias of the Commis-
sion’s economic approach. EU responses are 
uneasy because they cannot turn against univer-
sal suffrage and have limited resources. Nonethe-
less, alarming stances should be avoided: practice 
shows that the participation of populist parties in 
government coalitions has a ’normalising’ effect 
on their attitude. 
http://www.notre-europe.eu/fr/axes/democratie-en-
action/travaux/publication/les-citoyens-europeens-et-
lunion-europeenne-dans-le-contexte-actuel-de-crise/ 
Europe and the Arab revolutions: A new vi-
sion for democracy and human rights 
Although southern Mediterranean protesters 
share some of the EU’s values, transitions in the 
region are likely to produce results with which 
Europeans are uneasy. This brief argues that, in 
response, the EU should focus on the develop-
ment of legitimate and accountable governments 
in the Arab world aiming to create the back-
ground conditions for fair and inclusive politics, 
rather than back specific political groups. The EU 
should also support human rights and civil society 
development. Adopting such an approach in Li-
bya, Tunisia and Egypt and embedding it in its 
instruments – conditionality and a new European 
Endowment for Democracy – could ensure EU 
effectiveness. The use of violence against civilians 
in countries like Syria should be a red line for limi-
ting cooperation, drawing condemnation and 
sanctions in severe cases. 
h t t p : / / w w w . e c f r . e u / p a g e / - /
ECFR41_HUMAN_RIGHTS_BRIEF_AW.pdf 
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Départs 
Maria Alberta Ribeiro du secrétariat de l’équipe 
EGE a pris sa retraite le 1er novembre dernier. 
Evénements 
Le 8 novembre, le Président Barroso a rencontré, 
en présence de la Commissaire Vassiliou, une 
quarantaine d’acteurs du monde culturel venus 
de différents Etats-membres. Dans une 
atmosphère très positive, les échanges ont porté 
sur les politiques de l’Union en direction des arts 
et des industries culturelles, et plus largement sur 
la façon dont le secteur culturel peut contribuer 
au renforcement de l’esprit européen. 
Le projet-pilote ESPAS (European Strategy and 
Policy Analysis System), lancé en 2010 par la 
Commission suite à une initiative du Parlement 
européen, a fait l’objet de deux réunions 
marquant l’aboutissement d’une première étape. 
Le 9 novembre, une rencontre présidée par le 
BEPA a permis aux représentants de la Task 
Force interinstitutionnelle (Commission, Conseil, 
Parlement) de débattre du rapport sur les 
“tendances globales” à l’horizon 2030 préparé 
par l’Institut d’Etudes de Sécurité de l’UE. Les 
21 et 22 novembre, ce rapport a été présenté 
dans sa version finale à un panel plus large 
incluant des experts de la société civile et les 
représentants des cellules de planification 
stratégique européennes et extra-européennes 
(USA, Chine, Brésil). Un deuxième rapport 
consacré aux options politiques qui se présentent 
à l’Union est en préparation. En 2012, ESPAS 
fera l’objet d’une action préparatoire 
conformément à l’accord du Parlement 
européen. 
 
Le 15 novembre, le Groupe européen d’éthique 
(EGE) s’est réuni en présence d’experts 
extérieurs de haut niveau pour une discussion 
ouverte sur son projet d’Avis sur les implications 
éthiques des technologies de l’information et de la 
communication . Des représentants des 
organisations internationales (Nations-Unies, 
Conseil de l’Europe), du secteur privé (Google, 
ETNO), ainsi que du monde universitaire, 
étaient présents. Ces échanges très constructifs 
ont permis de mieux intégrer les différentes 
sensibilités dans l’Avis, qui sera soumis au 
Collège des commissaires en décembre et 
proposera plusieurs options politiques. 
Le journaliste et écrivain autrichien Robert 
Menasse a passé la semaine du 21 au 
25 novembre au BEPA à l’invitation du cabinet 
du Président, et dans le cadre de la préparation 
de son prochain ouvrage. Les entretiens qu’il 
souhaitait avoir avec les conseillers lui ont permis 
de mieux comprendre le rôle du BEPA et 
d’aborder des questions touchant à l’avenir de 
l’Union. 
Enfin, le 30 novembre, les organisations 
philosophiques et non-confessionnelles ont 
rencontré les Président Barroso, Buzek et Van 
Rompuy à l’occasion d’une réunion de travail et 
d’un déjeuner. Conformément à l’article 17 du 
Traité sur l’Union européenne, cette rencontre 
annuelle adopte le même format que le dialogue 
entre les institutions et les organisations 
confessionnelles. Une trentaine de représentants 
des associations humanistes européennes étaient 
présents et ont eu l’occasion de s’exprimer sur la 
protection et la promotion des libertés et des 
droits fondamentaux au sein de l’Union et dans 
le cadre de la politique de voisinage.  
4 BEPA News 
